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ABSTRACT
Various side-channel attacks (SCAs) on ICs have been successfully
demonstrated and also mitigated to some degree. In the context
of 3D ICs, however, prior art has mainly focused on efficient im-
plementations of classical SCA countermeasures. That is, SCAs
tailored for up-and-coming 3D ICs have been overlooked so far. In
this paper, we conduct such a novel study and focus on one of the
most accessible and critical side channels: thermal leakage of ac-
tivity and power patterns. We address the thermal leakage in 3D
ICs early on during floorplanning, along with tailored extensions
for power and thermal management. Our key idea is to carefully
exploit the specifics of material and structural properties in 3D ICs,
thereby decorrelating the thermal behaviour from underlying power
and activity patterns. Most importantly, we discuss powerful SCAs
and demonstrate how our open-source tool helps to mitigate them.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; •Hardware → 3D integrated circuits; Thermal is-
sues; Chip-level power issues; Partitioning and floorplanning;
1. INTRODUCTION
Side channels represent the physical interactions any electronic
device triggers in its surrounding, e.g., electromagnetic radiation
or heat dissipation. Side-channel attacks (SCAs) then seek to re-
trieve sensitive information (e.g., secret keys) by carefully monitor-
ing those physical interactions [1–3]. For example, Skorobogatov
and Woods [3] extracted an embedded AES key from a military-
grade FPGA using an advanced attack on the power side channel.
Another practical and effective side channel is the thermal leakage
of power and activity patterns [4, 5]. Being the scope of our work,
this side channel is elaborated in detail in Section 2.
3D integration is expected to successfully meet the increasingly
demanding requirements for modern ICs, such as high performance,
increased functionality, and low power consumption [6–8]. While
previous studies, early prototypes, and first commercial products
have focused on memory-logic integration (e.g., see [7–9]), there
is recent progress towards logic stacking as well, also driven by
technology innovations such as direct wafer bonding [6].
One major concern for 3D integration in general and for 3D
logic ICs in particular is the thermal and power management, which
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is furthermore highly technology dependent [10–12]. In practice,
3D ICs will require runtime capabilities for thermal management,
based on embedded on-chip thermal sensors [9, 13, 14].
SCAs in the context of 3D ICs have only recently come into
focus, and studies such as [15] mainly discuss how structural prop-
erties of 3D ICs may help in mitigating SCAs. The full potential of
SCAs specifically tailored for and targeting on 3D ICs has not been
explored yet. It is intuitive that SCAs developed for 2D ICs may
not be successful in 3D ICs, due to the different physical structures
of 2D and 3D ICs. Still, a practical SCA could be based on thermal
readings of 3D ICs, which is realistic due to the availability of and
relatively easy access to on-chip thermal sensors [5, 9, 13, 14].
SCA countermeasures in 3D ICs such as [16, 17] leverage 3D
integration mainly for efficient implementation of prior techniques.
For example, to mitigate timing-based SCAs on caches, Bao and
Srivastava [16] exploit the reduced latencies in 3D ICs in order
to implement random eviction and latency scattering, which are
otherwise (in the context of 2D ICs) arguably too costly measures.
The work of Gu et al. [18] seeks to mitigate thermal-related leak-
age in 3D ICs, and is of particular interest here. The authors pro-
pose to integrate (along with the actual functional circuitry) thermal
sensors, thermal-noise generators as well as runtime controllers.
These primitives “inject dummy activities” when-/wherever con-
sidered necessary and, hence, aim for smooth thermal profiles to
hinder thermal profiling of module activities. However, there are
major shortcomings of this work. First, the concept appears not
specifically tailored for 3D ICs—it does not explicitly address the
different structural and material properties, different heat paths or
thermal coupling effects in 3D ICs, nor does it elaborate on the im-
plementation of 3D ICs. Second, the “injection” principle causes
further power dissipation, which may be prohibitive for thermal-
and power-constrained 3D ICs in the first place. This shortcom-
ing is confirmed by an observation in [18] itself: the best leakage-
mitigation rates are only achievable for the highest injection rates.
In this work, we take a fundamentally different approach by
considering security as a design parameter. We propose an SCA-
aware floorplanning methodology that decorrelates the thermal be-
haviour from power and activity patterns, protecting against a very
practical and potentially effective threat for the security of 3D ICs.
2. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
2.1 Thermal Side Channel
The thermal side channel (TSC) has recently gained more atten-
tion, also thanks to case studies such as [4,5]. For example, Masti et
al. [5] have shown for Intel Xeon multi-core processors that (i) pro-
cess executions on one core can be detected in adjacent cores, and
that (ii) different processes, when scheduled by turns in one core,
can build a covert channel with up to 12.5 bit/s.
The TSC is particularly attractive for three reasons: (i) it is easy
to access via widely available on-chip sensors [5, 9, 13, 14]; (ii) it
provides internal and external leakage of activity/computation pat-
terns through thermal variations [4, 5]; and (iii) it may serve as
proxy for the power side-channel using temperature-to-power inter-
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polation techniques such as [19]. An attacker can obtain localized
thermal readings either directly or estimate them, e.g., using in-
terpolation techniques. We note that interpolation techniques have
been demonstrated to achieve high-accuracy and high-resolution
estimates of both power and temperatures in large-scale 3D ICs [9].
In general, an attacker can monitor the thermal patterns of an
IC either at regular runtime or when he/she applies specific input
patterns, crafted to reveal the activity of sensitive components. We
address both scenarios for the attacker’s capabilities and the SCAs
we formulate (Section 5) and evaluate (Section 7).
Practical limitations of the TSC are the following:
• The classical heat equation models power and temperature
as linearly correlated. In practice, however, this behaviour is
constrained by material properties, i.e., thermal conductivi-
ties and capacitances both within and across the boundaries
of chips [4]. In other words, a linear correlation of (secret)
activity patterns and (leaked) thermal patterns is only appli-
cable for homogeneous material properties. This has direct
implications for our work, as elaborated in Section 3.
• Due to relatively large thermal capacitances and resistances
present in modern ICs, especially in 3D ICs, the internal heat
flow is much slower than the underlying activity/power pat-
terns (Figure 1). That is, the TSC has a relatively low band-
width, which hinders the leakage of highly dynamic compu-
tation [4]. We assume strong capabilities for practical attacks
(Section 5), rendering the TSC attractive nevertheless.
• As with any side channel, the TSC experiences noisy read-
ings; the heating effects of active modules are both spatially
and temporally superposed. For any 2D/3D IC, these noise
patterns may range from negligible to dominant effects, de-
pending on the floorplan, the resulting power distribution, the
material properties, and the heat paths along with their dissi-
pation capabilities. Our assumptions for the attacker’s capa-
bilities address and mitigate also this limitation (Section 5).
2.2 Scope of Our Work
In this novel work, we focus on the design-time mitigation of
thermal-related SCAs in 3D ICs. In contrast, previous work lever-
ages 3D ICs only as implementation option for available (2D) SCA
countermeasures, or neglects key aspects of 3D ICs (Section 1).
Our key idea is the following: we exploit the specifics of ma-
terial and structural properties in 3D ICs, in order to effectively
decorrelate thermal patterns from the power and activity patterns.
We conduct our study in the context of 3D floorplanning for
two reasons. First, optimizing the thermal and power distribu-
tions of 3D ICs is essential (due to their high integration densi-
ties), and floorplanning is widely acknowledged as an appropri-
ate design stage to do so [10, 11, 20]. Second, chip designer typ-
ically have to reuse some “black box” intellectual-property (IP)
modules, with limited access to only basic properties (e.g., area,
inputs/outputs, power), while they still hope to mitigate potential
SCAs. Our methodology is applicable in such scenarios through
leakage-aware design techniques during block-level floorplanning.
We make our work publicly available within the open-source
3D floorplanner Corblivar [21]; see Sections 6 and 7 for details.
3. INITIAL FINDINGS
We next discuss exploratory experiments for through-silicon via
(TSV)-based 3D ICs with two dies.1 For the thermal analysis we
use HotSpot 6.0 [22]. We model the heatsink atop the 3D IC, the
signal TSVs acting as “heat-pipes” between stacked dies, and also
the secondary path conducting heat towards the package. Further
details are given in Section 7. We investigated all 30 combinations
1Thermal maps would be considerably different for other 3D in-
tegration flavors, e.g., for monolithic 3D ICs [12]. Our leakage-
mitigation techniques are generic; they may be tailored towards
different flavors, which will be the scope for future work.
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Figure 1: The different time scales of activity/power (solid
black curve) and temperature (dashed red curve) in ICs. In this
paper, we focus on 3D ICs with two dies, stacked face-to-back.
of 5 different power distributions (globally uniform, locally uni-
form, medium gradients, small gradients, and large gradients) and
6 different TSV distributions (no TSVs; maximal TSV density, i.e.,
100% of area covered by TSVs and their keep-out zones; irregular
TSVs; irregular TSVs along with regular TSVs; irregular groups
of densely packed TSVs, i.e., TSV islands; and TSV islands along
with regular TSVs). Note that some of these power and TSV dis-
tributions are impractical, yet relevant for exploratory experiments.
Figure 2 illustrates a few selected power and thermal maps.
The key initial finding for thermal-leakage trends in 3D ICs is
that the correlation of activity/power patterns and the thermal be-
haviour mainly depends on both (i) the power-density distributions
and (ii) the TSV distributions. We observe high correlations for:
(i) non-uniform power distributions with large gradients, both
within dies and across dies. For example, Figure 2(e–h) ex-
hibits large power gradients, while Figures 2(a–d) and 2(i–l)
show somewhat smooth gradients. We observe the lowest
correlations for globally uniform power distributions (Fig-
ure 2[a–d]), which are, however, artificial and impractical.
Locally uniform power distributions are more realistic, and
we observe that such distributions exhibit low correlations
as well, especially along with irregular TSVs or distributed
TSV islands. For example, comparing Figure 2(k, l) with
Figure 2(c, d), we observe largely decorrelated thermal pat-
terns, although the underlying power distribution of the for-
mer appears notably more diverse than its counterpart.
(ii) large numbers of regularly arranged TSVs. For example, see
Figure 2(e–h) with regularly placed TSVs and TSV islands
versus Figures 2(a–d) with irregularly placed TSVs and 2(i–
l) with only TSV islands. Note that the use of few regular
TSVs and/or TSV islands may locally further reduce the cor-
relation. For example, see Figure 2(j), where a local thermal
minima is observable in the lower right region, despite the
relatively high power density underlying (Figure 2[i]).
It may be more intuitive to formulate these findings vice
versa—the less regular and/or fewer the TSVs, the lower is
the correlation. As indicated for the limitations of the TSC
(Subsection 2.1), an unbiased and high correlation is only
found in homogeneous structures. Inserting copper/tungsten-
based TSVs into the silicon dies invalidates that assumption,
especially when TSVs are few and irregularly distributed.
4. MODELS FOR THERMAL LEAKAGE
4.1 Correlation and Correlation Stability
We propose the Pearson correlation of power and thermal maps
as a key metric for thermal-related leakage. Note that the Pear-
son correlation is also the underlying measure for the side-channel
vulnerability factor (SVF) [23], an established metric for the vul-
nerability of ICs in terms of information leakage via side channels.
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Figure 2: A 3D IC floorplanned on two dies, with three different power scenarios illustrated in rows. From left to right, each row
illustrates the power-density map of the lower die (a, e, i), the thermal map for that die (b, f, j), and the power (c, g, k) and thermal
map (d, h, l) for the upper die. Each scenario exhibits distinct patterns for power and TSV distributions (the latter are illustrated
as white dots in [b, f, j]), resulting in different trends for the power-temperature correlations as follows. Top row: artificially unified
power for all modules with irregularly placed TSVs, resulting in the lowest correlation; middle row: large power gradients with both
regular TSVs and TSV islands, resulting in the highest correlation; bottom row: groups of locally similar power regimes with TSV
islands, resulting in relatively low correlation. The units of the power and thermal maps are 10−2µW/µm2 and K, respectively.
Along with our assumptions for the attacker’s capabilities (Sec-
tion 5), the Pearson correlation is comparably meaningful as the
SVF. That is, the lower the correlation, the lower the leakage of
power/activity patterns via the TSC, and the lower the vulnerabil-
ity of the IC. Given the power and thermal maps of a 3D IC, we
measure the correlation coefficient rd on each die d separately:
rd =
∑n
i=1(pi − p¯)(ti − t¯)√∑n
i=1 (pi − p¯)2
√∑n
i=1 (ti − t¯)2
(1)
where p¯, t¯ are the average power and temperature values, respec-
tively, and pi, ti are the individual values, both over all n locations
in die d. The locations/values are to be organized in grids with
same dimensions for both power and thermal maps/grids.
Note that Equation 1 models the correlation only for one steady-
state case, i.e., for arbitrary but fixed power and temperature values.
We propose another correlation measure to capture the runtime sta-
bility of correlation rd,x,y for locations/bins x, y on die d:
rd,x,y =
∑m
i=1(pi,x,y − px,y)(ti,x,y − tx,y)√∑m
i=1 (pi,x,y − px,y)2
√∑m
i=1
(
ti,x,y − tx,y
)2 (2)
with m different sets of activities, where power and temperature
readings may vary notably. The lower the stability rd,x,y , the lower
the thermal leakage for various ranges of power/activity patterns at
particular locations x, y within the die d of the 3D IC.
4.2 Spatial Entropy of Power Maps
As proposed by Claramunt [24], the spatial entropy assesses the
dispersion of the classical entropy over some regions. It is based
on two principles: (i) the closer the different entities, the higher the
spatial entropy; and (ii) the closer the similar entities, the lower
the spatial entropy. We note that this is in good correspondence
to the phenomenon of heat distribution—the closer the differently
powered heat sources, the higher the spatial entropy of the super-
posed thermal responses, i.e., the thermal gradients; and the closer
the similarly powered heat sources, the lower the thermal gradients.
Hence, our notion for modeling the spatial entropy of power
maps is to anticipate the degree of the thermal gradients; recall that
large thermal gradients hint on large thermal leakage (Section 3).
Our formulation, derived from [24], measures the spatial entropy
of power maps in 3D ICs for each die d as follows:
Sd = −
n∑
i=1
dinteri
dintrai
( |ci|
|C| log2
|ci|
|C|
)
(3)
where ci ∈ C are classes of similar-value power ranges, and dinteri
and dintrai are the average spatial inter- and intra-class distances.
We calculate those distances according to [24], in which we use
Manhattan distances for bins (i.e., class members) in the equidistant
power-map grids we construct for each die. For fast and effective
classification of those grids, we employ nested-means partitioning:
the power values are first sorted, then recursively bi-partitioned
with the current mean defining the cut, and the partitioning pro-
ceeds until the standard deviation within any class approaches zero.
As the spatial entropy does not account for thermal analysis and
subsequent correlation calculations, it lacks the capability to verify
the actual leakage. It is, however, suitable for fast estimation of the
potential leakage during floorplanning loops/iterations. During our
experiments (Sections 3 and 7), we observe the following trend for
the bottom die (d = 1), even for different TSV patterns: the lower
the spatial entropy, the lower the power-temperature correlation.
5. THERMAL SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS
Our assumptions: An attacker has direct and physical access
to the targeted 3D IC, but can conduct only non-invasive attacks.2
That is, he/she may apply (arbitrary) input patterns and observe
both the actual outputs and the thermal behaviour of the 3D IC.
2In contrast to 2D ICs, we may expect invasive probing and reverse
engineering of 3D ICs to be notably more difficult and costly.
We also assume that the attacker has a system-level understanding
of the 3D IC, e.g., as obtained from datasheets. This is important
for purposefully crafting input patterns to trigger certain activities.
We make further strong assumptions enabling an attacker to cir-
cumvent the critical limitations of the TSC (Subsection 2.1). First,
the attacker can stabilize the 3D IC’s activity with the help of specif-
ically crafted, repetitive input patterns. Second, he/she may await
the thermal steady-state response after applying any input. Both as-
sumptions ensure that the TSC readout correlates only with the in-
put patterns. Third, the attacker has unlimited access to all thermal
sensors, spread across the 3D IC, and can thus obtain high-accuracy
and continuous thermal readings of any (part of a) module at will.
We believe that these assumptions are relevant and practical when
attacking security-critical (3D) ICs. For example, a security mod-
ule may check whether a provided password is correct, and only
then trigger data decryption. The thermal patterns for complex de-
cryption operations will be relatively easy to distinguish from sim-
ple matching operations for password checks. An attacker may
then brute-force a password even when the security module itself is
“silent”, i.e., when it would not directly react to wrong passwords.
Attacks based on the TSC in 3D ICs are formulated next, with
consideration of the attacker’s capabilities outlined above. Note
that similar attacks have been discussed and successfully conducted
on classical (2D) microcontrollers by Hutter and Schmidt [4].
1. Thermal characterization of the 3D IC: This is typically an
exploratory attack, and others may follow as outlined below.
Step by step, the attacker will apply a broad and varied range
of input patterns in order to trigger as many activity patterns
as possible. By monitoring the TSC, he/she can then build a
model for the thermal behaviour of the 3D IC.
2. Localization and monitoring of modules: The attacker tar-
gets on particular modules by applying crafted input patterns;
the objective is to trigger these modules and observe thermal
variations exclusively or at least predominantly within these
modules. Given the attacker’s lack of implementation details
and hence the lack of a precise input-to-activity mapping, this
attack is typically applied iteratively, with varying inputs. In
case the characterization attack outlined above has been suc-
cessfully applied, those efforts may be much lower. Once
the thermal response is confined to particular regions, i.e.,
modules of interest are localized with some confidence, fur-
ther attacks may be applied. Most notably, an attacker may
now observe the sensitive activity/computation of particular
modules by monitoring them during runtime.
6. METHODOLOGY
The objective of our work is to account for thermal leakage in 3D
ICs directly and continuously within the floorplanning stage that
also optimizes for classical criteria. That is, during our iterative
floorplanning flow (Figure 3), we memorize the 3D floorplans with
lowest correlations coefficients and spatial entropies (Section 4) as
best in terms of thermal leakage, but we select the final solution
while also accounting for other criteria such as wirelength and crit-
ical delays; see Section 7 for details of our setups.
We implement and publicly release all our techniques within
Corblivar [21, 25]. We opt for this 3D floorplanning framework
mainly because it is multi-objective, modular, and competitive. An
for our work essential feature of Corblivar is its fast thermal anal-
ysis, which enables us to continuously estimate the correlation.
However, we found this fast analysis to be inferior to the detailed
analysis of HotSpot [22], especially for diverse arrangements of
TSVs. Thus, we also verify the final correlation after floorplanning.
6.1 Management of Power Distributions
Recall that non-uniform power distributions with large gradients
induce notable thermal leakage (Section 3). A key measure in our
work is thus the management of global and local power distribu-
tions. To this end, we develop efficient algorithms for floorplanning-
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Figure 3: The flow of our methodology, implemented as exten-
sion for the open-source 3D floorplanner Corblivar [21, 25].
centric voltage assignment, a technique well-known for power man-
agement in 2D ICs [26], but so far mostly overlooked for 3D ICs.
For any floorplan layout, we initially estimate the timing paths.
We do so because the prospects for voltage assignment depend pri-
marily on timing slacks—the more slack a module has, the lower
the voltage we may apply, and the more controllable its power and
thermal footprints become. We estimate the net delays via the well-
known Elmore delays (here with consideration of wires and TSVs),
and the delays of modules are estimated as proposed in [27].
Voltage volumes—the generalized 3D version of voltage domains
spanning across multiple dies—are constructed next. We do so by
considering each module individually as the root for a multi-branch
tree representation of voltage volumes. Each tree/volume is recur-
sively build up via a breadth-first search across the respectively ad-
jacent modules. During this merging procedure, we update the re-
sulting set of feasible voltages, i.e., the voltages we may commonly
apply for all modules within the volume without violating any tim-
ing/delay constraints. As result, a finalized tree represents a set of
practical voltage volumes: each node comprises a volume, and all
the modules and voltages are encoded in the node and its ancestors.
Finally, we select voltage volumes such that we optimize (i) for
locally uniform power densities within volumes, and (ii) for small
power gradients across volumes, as motivated by our initial findings
(Section 3). To this end, we target for lowest standard deviations of
power values both within voltage volumes and across volumes.
We found that our techniques induce a low runtime cost, around
30%, when compared to 3D floorplanning without voltage assign-
ment. This is noteworthy because previous work [27, 28] employ
computationally-expensive MILP formulations which render their
integration into 3D floorplanning flows impractical in the first place.
6.2 Sampling of Activities and Post-processing
To impersonate an attacker triggering various activity patterns by
alternating the inputs at runtime, we model the power profiles of all
modules as Gaussian distributions. Without loss of generality, we
set up each distribution with the module’s nominal power value as
mean and a standard deviation of 10%. We stepwise evaluate all
the steady-state temperatures using HotSpot [22] and sample the
correlation stability (Equation 2) in 100 runs over the whole 3D IC.
Continuing the runtime sampling process, we iteratively insert
dummy thermal TSVs where the most stable correlations occur, as
long as the resulting average correlation is reduced. This stop crite-
rion represents the final “sweet spot” where further TSV insertion
would increase the overall correlation again (Subsection 7.1).
7. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We select arbitrary GSRC and IBM-HB+ benchmarks, and their
properties are reviewed in Table 1. Note that we scale up the mod-
ules’ footprints in order to obtain sufficiently large dies; 3D ICs are
only superior to 2D ICs for large-scale integration [10,20,25]. The
resulting die outlines are fixed, making the floorplanning problem
practical yet challenging [25]. For stacking of the two dies, we as-
sume the face-to-back fashion [6, 20] (see also Figure 1). Further
technical details such as material properties and TSV dimensions
are given in the respective default configurations of [21, 22].
Each benchmark is floorplanned 50 times in two different setups:
(i) power-aware floorplannning and (ii) TSC-aware floorplanning.
It is important to note that setup (i) provides a competitive and
challenging baseline for the evaluation of (ii). Unlike we do in (i),
most previous work did not account for continuous optimization of
the voltage assignment within the optimization loops, and may have
thus missed on the full potential of power-aware 3D floorplanning.
For (i), we optimize the packing density, wirelength, critical de-
lay, peak temperature, and voltage assignment, all at the same time;
all criteria are weighted equally. For voltage assignment we seek to
minimize both the overall power and the number of required volt-
age volumes. For (ii), we consider the same criteria as for (i), ren-
dering it a practical and competitive setup. Additionally, we seek
to minimize both the average correlation coefficients and the aver-
age spatial entropies. Here, for voltage assignment, we now seek to
minimize (a) the number of required voltage volumes and (b) the
standard deviations of power gradients among and across differ-
ent volumes. For implementing the voltage volumes in both setups
(i) and (ii), we consider three options: 0.8V, with power scaling
of 0.817× and delay scaling of 1.56×; 1.0V, without impact on
power/delay; and 1.2V, with 1.496× power scaling and 0.83× de-
lay scaling. These values are simulated for the 90nm node [27].
7.1 On Destabilizing the Leakage Correlation
A low runtime stability of correlations is crucial to thwart TSC
attacks (Section 5): the lower the correlation for various inputs, the
less likely an attacker succeeds when modeling the thermal leakage.
We observe that our techniques greatly reduce both the runtime
stability of correlations and the nominal, steady-state correlations.
Consider Figure 4 as an example. In order to meet timing con-
straints, some modules (colored red in Figure 4[a]) had to have
high voltages assigned. The accordingly high power consumption
of those modules disrupts the otherwise more uniform power dis-
tribution (Figure 4[b]). As a result, for varying activity patterns
triggered by an attacker, the highest stability of correlations occurs
around those modules. Our post-processing stage consequently in-
serts dummy TSVs there (see black dots in Figure 4[a]). For the
nominal case, i.e., for average activity patterns, the resulting shift
in thermal behaviour is reflected in Figure 4(c, d). In this example,
the correlation coefficient drops from 0.461 to 0.324. This means
that an attacker seeking to retrieve sensitive activities based on ther-
mal readings is on average ≈ 30% less likely to succeed.
We find that the insertion of dummy thermal TSVs may stabilize
the correlation again, by inducing adverse side-effects on previ-
ously more decorrelated regions. For example, consider the upper
left corner in Figure 4(c, d): the local correlation there increased to
some degree, due to the insertion of TSVs in the other, previously
highly correlated regions like the lower right corner. To account for
Name # Modules Modules’ # Nets # Terminal Outline Power (for
(Hard/Soft) Scale Factor Pins [mm2] 1.0V) [W]
n100 (0/100) 10 885 334 16 7.83
n200 (0/200) 10 1,585 564 16 7.84
n300 (0/300) 10 1,893 569 23.04 13.05
ibm01 (246/665) 2 5,829 246 25 4.02
ibm03 (290/999) 2 10,279 283 64 19.78
ibm07 (291/829) 2 15,047 287 64 9.92
Table 1: Properties of GSRC and IBM-HB+ Benchmarks
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Figure 4: (a) An exemplary floorplan for the bottom die of
benchmark n100, (b) its power distribution, the thermal maps
(c) before and (d) after TSV insertion by post-processing.
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Figure 5: Spatial entropies (S1, S2) and correlation coefficients
(r1, r2) for power-aware floorplanning (PA) and thermal side-
channel-aware floorplanning (TSC). Illustrated are the average
ranges over 50 floorplanning runs; see also Table 2.
such trade-off effects, recall that our post-processing stage inserts
dummy TSVs only as long as the overall correlation decreases. Al-
ternatively, we may adapt that stage to focus on reducing the corre-
lation stability primarily for the critical module(s) to be protected
from TSC attacks, and to accept more stable correlations elsewhere.
7.2 Leakage Trends and Mitigation Rates
To understand general trends on the thermal leakage in 3D ICs
and the mitigation rates offered by our techniques, we next discuss
the average ranges of spatial entropies and correlation coefficients
over 50 runs (Figure 5 and Table 2). However, it is important to
note that these numbers do not reflect well on best cases, which a
designer will select carefully depending on the needs for security
and the margin for design cost; see Subsection 7.3 for the latter.
When comparing the power-aware and the TSC-aware results,
the key observation is that the latter exhibit lower correlations for
the bottom die (r1), by 16.79% for the largest GSRC benchmark
n300, by 15.25% for the largest IBM-HB+ benchmark ibm03, and
by 7.71% over all benchmarks on average. While the average re-
duction over all benchmarks may appear somewhat low, its impact
is important. It translates directly to 7.71% higher noise on aver-
age for an attacker, and to an accordingly higher degree of freedom
for a designer to employ sensitive modules. Besides, a notewor-
thy trend here is the scalability: the larger the circuit, the lower the
correlation achieved by our TSC-aware floorplanning.
Power-Aware Floorplanning Thermal Side-Channel-Aware Floorplanning
Metric GSRC Benchmarks IBM-HB+ Benchmarks GSRC Benchmarks IBM-HB+ Benchmarks
n100 n200 n300 ibm01 ibm03 ibm07 Avg n100 n200 n300 ibm01 ibm03 ibm07 Avg
Spatial Entropy S1 2.787 3.718 4.315 4.462 3.830 3.727 3.806 2.735 3.635 4.350 4.348 4.040 3.689 3.799
Correlation Coefficient r1 0.476 0.249 0.274 0.199 0.459 0.446 0.351 0.471 0.238 0.228 0.189 0.389 0.426 0.324
Spatial Entropy S2 2.982 3.905 4.237 2.752 1.061 3.314 3.041 2.868 3.698 4.086 2.668 1.140 3.219 2.946
Correlation Coefficient r2 0.708 0.642 0.625 0.771 0.928 0.694 0.728 0.719 0.662 0.649 0.795 0.919 0.695 0.739
Overall Power [W] 7.890 7.801 12.522 4.291 27.038 10.737 11.713 10.331 8.172 12.967 4.520 26.829 11.247 12.344
Critical Delay [ns] 0.833 0.784 1.164 1.49 3.54 2.82 1.771 0.878 0.817 1.162 1.607 3.831 3.434 1.954
Wirelength [m] 30.671 29.086 37.100 21.491 57.999 108.020 47.394 32.956 28.733 33.928 21.913 57.449 112.468 47.907
Peak Temp [K] [22] 309.811 308.475 311.095 303.496 334.759 308.715 312.725 315.563 309.246 312.168 303.459 311.066 309.201 310.117
Signal TSVs 451 897 1,100 3,489 3,809 10,740 3,414 451 897 1,099 3,490 3,806 10,741 3,414
Dummy Thermal TSVs – – – – – – – 64 29 25 3 16 144 47
Voltage Volumes 6.900 12.365 14.365 3.675 5.333 3.027 7.610 9.705 17.048 19.658 14.256 12.909 11.888 14.244
Runtime [s] 83 218 262 489 197 507 226 287 531 524 1075 374 667 576
Table 2: Average Spatial Entropies, Correlation Coefficients (Top) and Average Design Cost (Bottom) Over 50 Runs of Power-Aware
Floorplanning (Left) versus Thermal Side-Channel-Aware Floorplanning (Right)
Both the power-aware and the TSC-aware setup can achieve low
correlations for the bottom die, but at the cost of notably higher
correlations for the top die. This limitation is due to the following:
since the heatsink is attached above the top die, Corblivar [21, 25]
by default employs a thermal design rule to place high-power mod-
ules preferably into the top die. In turn, this results in large power
gradients across the two dies as well as within the top die. Large
gradients in the top die naturally increase its correlation. Further-
more, the large disparities between the two dies obfuscate any “heat
injection” from the bottom die into the top die which may other-
wise decrease the top die’s correlation, e.g., see Figure 2(e–h) ver-
sus Figure 2(a–d). While we may relax Corblivar’s design rule, we
found that this prohibitively increases the peak temperatures.
7.3 Design Impact and Effectiveness
Next, we discuss the average impact on other design criteria
(Table 2). Again, these results are relevant to understand general
trends, while they do not represent particular corner cases.
Recall that a key measure in our methodology is the management
of global and local power distributions, realized by tailored voltage
assignment. Our technique increases power only by 5.38% on aver-
age when compared to power-aware floorplanning, whose key cri-
terion is minimal power. Despite this (limited) increase of power,
we observe notable reductions of the steady-state peak tempera-
tures, namely by 13.22% on average (i.e., with respect to the am-
bient temperature of 293K). We consider this as a beneficial side-
effect of our multi-objective and iterative 3D floorplanning flow.
Besides, we observe an average impact on other criteria as fol-
lows: wires are 1.08% longer, critical delays increase by 10.33%,
and, most notably, 87.17% more voltage volumes are implemented.
Finally, we note that (i) power- and TSC-aware floorplanning ex-
hibit the same average number of signal TSVs, and that (ii) TSC-
aware floorplanning employs only few additional thermal TSVs
(1.37% on average). Both findings indicate that our TSC-aware
floorplanning realizes the reported low correlation not only by care-
fully inserting dummy TSVs, but more so by thoroughly exploring
the 3D design space. This is achieved for the first time thanks to
our effective and efficient floorplanning techniques.
8. CONCLUSION
In this work, we address the thermal leakage of secret compu-
tation/activity patterns within up-and-coming 3D ICs. In general,
thermal side-channel attacks are considered practical and effective;
this is in contrast to other laborious attacks such as invasive prob-
ing, which are for 3D ICs presumably even more difficult.
We model thermal leakage as a built-in criteria into floorplanning
and minimize it using novel and efficient techniques, thereby incor-
porating security early on in the 3D IC design flow. Our techniques
are based on the key findings that thermal leakage in 3D ICs de-
pends on and, thus, can be controlled by the power distributions
along with the arrangement of through-silicon vias.
For future work, we shall address the thermal leakage in larger
3D-IC stacks and for other flavours such as monolithic integration.
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